"[91]
The present Union owes its very existence to the dissolution, by
separate secession of its members, of the former Union, which, as we
have thus seen, as to its _organic principles_, rested upon precisely
the same foundation. The right to withdraw from the association results,
in either case, from the same principles--principles which, I think,
have been established on an impregnable basis of history, reason, law,
and precedent.
It is not contended that this right should be resorted to for
insufficient cause, or, as the writer already quoted on the law of
partnership says, "wantonly and injuriously to the other partners,"
without responsibility of the seceding party for any damage thus done.
No association can be dissolved without a likelihood of the occurrence
of incidental questions concerning common property and mutual
obligations--questions sometimes of a complex and intricate sort. If a
wrong be perpetrated, in such case, it is a matter for determination by
the means usually employed among independent and sovereign
powers--negotiation, arbitration, or, in the failure of these, by war,
with which, unfortunately, Christianity and civilization have not yet
been able entirely to dispense. But the suggestion of possible evils
does not at all affect the question of right. There is no great
principle in the affairs either of individuals or of nations that is not
liable to such difficulties in its practical application.
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