It
may be that _they_ were right, and that we, who counseled delay and
forbearance, were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen the
ultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and the
perfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, our
advice would have been different.
Certain resolutions, said to have been adopted in a meeting of Senators
held on the evening of the 5th of January,[110] have been magnified, by
the representations of artful commentators on the events of the period,
into something vastly momentous.
The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we could
not longer advise delay, and even that was unimportant under the
circumstances, for three of the States concerned had taken final action
on the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated to
them. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which we
had all become convinced by the experience of the previous month--that
our long-cherished hopes had proved illusory--that further efforts in
Congress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained, except that the
States should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges of
their wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended the
formation of a confederacy among the seceding States as early as
possible after their secession--advice the expediency of which could
hardly be questioned, either by friend or foe.
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