The
sequel will be told hereafter.
It was then late, and we rode back in the night, say seven miles, to the
army headquarters. I had not seen General Beauregard on the field, and
did not find him at his quarters when we returned; the promise made to
the troops was therefore communicated to a staff-officer, who said he
would have the supplies sent out. At a later hour when I met General
Beauregard and informed him of what had occurred, he stated that,
because of a false alarm which had reached him, he had ordered the
troops referred to from the left to the right of our line, so as to be
in position to repel the reported movement of the enemy against that
flank. That such an alarm should have been credited, and a night march
ordered on account of it, shows how little the completeness of the
victory was realized.
[Footnote 178: see "Rebellion Record," vol. ii, pp. 164, 165.]
CHAPTER VII.
Conference with the Generals after the Battle.--Order to pursue
the Enemy.--Evidences of a Thorough Rout.--"Sweet to die for
such a Cause."--Movements of the Next Day.--What more it was
practicable to do.--Charge against the President of preventing
the Capture of Washington.--The Failure to pursue.--Reflection
on the President.--General Beauregard's Report.--Endorsement
upon it.--Strength of the Opposing Forces.--Extracts relating to
the Battle, from the Narrative of General Early.
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