But I
prefer to answer your objection on other and broader grounds.
"I hold that, when a specific power is granted by the
Constitution, like that now in question, 'to raise armies,'
Congress is the judge whether the law passed for the purpose of
executing that power is 'necessary and proper.' It is not enough
to say that armies might be raised in other ways, and that,
therefore, this particular way is not 'necessary.' The same
argument might be used against _every_ mode of raising armies.
To each successive mode suggested, the objection would be that
other modes were practicable, and that, therefore, the
particular mode used was not 'necessary.' The true and only test
is to inquire whether the law is intended and calculated to
carry out the object; whether it devises and creates an
instrumentality for executing the specific power granted; and,
if the answer be in the affirmative, the law is constitutional.
None can doubt that the conscription law is calculated and
intended to 'raise armies'; it is, therefore, 'necessary and
proper' for the execution of that power, and is constitutional,
unless it comes in conflict with some other provision of our
Confederate compact.
"You express the opinion that this conflict exists, and support
your argument by the citation of those clauses which refer to
the militia.
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