Although there would only be a wildly remote chance of Russia ever
relinquishing her Asiatic prey, the bare mention of the words "will be
evacuated by England" was a possible contingency and risk, that would
effectually exclude all British capital from investment in the island. I
could not discover any possible good that could accrue to England by the
terms of the Convention. If Cyprus had been presented as a "bonus" by
the Porte to counterbalance the risk we should incur in a defensive
alliance for the protection of Asia Minor, I could have seen an addition
to our Colonial Empire of a valuable island, that would not only have
been of strategical value, but such that in a few years, money and
British settlers would have entirely changed its present aspect, and
have created for it a new era of prosperity.
If England had purchased Cyprus, I could have understood the plain,
straightforward, business-like transaction, which would have at once
established confidence, both among the inhabitants, who would have
become British subjects; and through the outer world, that would have
acknowledged the commencement of a great future.
But, if we were actually bound in defensive alliance with Turkey in case
of a war with Russia, why should we occupy Cyprus upon such one-sided
and anomalous conditions, that would frustrate all hopes of commercial
development, for the sake of obtaining a strategical position that would
have been opened to our occupation AS AN ALLY at any moment? On the
other hand, if we distrusted Turkey, and feared that she might coquet
with Russia at some future period, I could see a paramount necessity for
the occupation of Cyprus, and even Egypt; but we were supposed to be,
and I believe were, acting in absolute and mutual good faith as the
protector of Asiatic Turkey, in defensive alliance with the Sultan.
Pages:
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32