As a
strategical point, Cyprus must be represented by Famagousta, without
which it would be useless for the ostensible purpose of its occupation.
Many persons of great practical experience would have preferred Crete,
as already possessing a safe harbour in Suda Bay, with a climate
superior to that of Cyprus, while according to our assumed defensive
alliance with Turkey in the event of a renewed attack by Russia, we
should have acquired the advantage of Cyprus whenever required, without
the expense or responsibility, and we should in addition have
established a station on the coast of Asia Minor at the secure harbour
afforded by the Gulf of Ayas at Alexandretta.
These geographical questions are a matter of opinion, but now that we
actually have occupied Cyprus it is absolutely necessary to do
something. Without Famagousta, the island would be worthless as a naval
station; with it, as a first-class harbour and arsenal, we should
dominate the eastern portion of the Mediterranean, entirely command the
approach to Egypt, and keep open our communications with the Suez Canal
and the consequent route to India. In the event of the Euphrates valley
line of railway becoming an accomplished fact, Cyprus will occupy the
most commanding position. But, all these advantages will be neutralised
unless Famagousta shall represent the power of England like Malta and
Gibraltar.
Pages:
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216