The same authorities now see Russia in
possession, while England, who has not assisted during the bloody
struggle, appears upon the scene as a political Paul Pry, and intrudes
upon the mysteries that surround Pachas, Governors, and various
functionaries, who, from the highest to the lowest official, mainly
exist upon extortion.
It is hardly necessary to explain that British assistance in such a form
will be most unwelcome, and will increase our reputation for
intermeddling while in the hour of extremity we withhold the required
aid. Any interference on our part with the administration of Asia Minor
will cause an extreme jealousy and suspicion throughout all classes of
Turkish officials, who will be rendered the more amenable to the guiles
of Russian intrigues from Kars and Ardahan. A very slight knowledge of
Turkish character would induce the natural conclusion. The English would
be suspected of coveting Asia Minor, as they had already obtained
Cyprus, and Russia would have gained her end in destroying all
confidence that might possibly have existed, and thus endanger the
defensive alliance.
There are serious risks that might enforce the advance of Russian troops
beyond the defined frontier. Already there are reports of general
discontent and threatened disturbances. In the event of a mutiny of
Turkish troops on the Russian border, the Russians might be invited to
assist by the Pacha in command.
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