It should have been distinctly agreed that Turkey
should raise a territorial army of an estimated strength for the
protection of Asia Minor, and that a certain number of British officers
should hold important commands, to ensure the regular payment of the
troops and to maintain the necessary discipline. Had such conditions
been defined, and the civil courts been placed under the supervision of
British officials, the Protectorate of Asia Minor would have become a
practical combination that would have been an effectual check to Russian
encroachments; but as the affair now stands, the alliance is fraught
with extreme danger to ourselves. I cannot conceive the possibility of a
credulity that would induce experienced statesmen to believe in the
assurances given either by Turkey or by Russia. The history of the past
is sufficient to prove the utter fallacy of assertions, promises, and
treaties; Turkey will persist in mal-administration; Russia, who is now
marching upon Merv in spite of former assurances, as she advanced on
Khiva under similar pretexts, will at the moment of her own selection
assuredly break through her boundaries in Asia Minor. The position of
England will be contemptible. We have thrown down the gauntlet to Russia
by an ostentatious alliance with Turkey, but we hesitate to insist upon
the overwhelming necessity of British official and military officers
to organise the civil administration and an army of defence; thus, when
the sudden emergency shall arise, Turkey will be totally unprepared; the
various races that comprise her Asiatic dominions will already have been
poisoned by intrigue, and the only defence that can be offered to a
Russian advance will be afforded by Turkish neglect, which has left the
country devoid of roads.
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