Not that I
had the design of treating these with any thoroughness, but
only so to speak in passing, and in order to ascertain by the
judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on. For
these questions have always appeared to me to be of such
importance that I judged it suitable to speak of them more
than once; and the road which I follow in the explanation of
them is so little trodden, and so far removed from the
ordinary path, that I did not judge it to be expedient to set
it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be
read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe
that it was permitted to them to attempt to follow the same
path.
But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those
who have found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to
do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it,
nothing worthy of remark has been objected to in them beyond
two matters: to these two I wish here to reply in a few words
before undertaking their more detailed discussion.
The first objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not
perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks, that its
nature or its essence consists only in its being a thing that
thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other
things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature
of the soul.
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