And further I show in
what sense it is true to say that the certainty of geometrical
demonstrations is itself dependent on the knowledge of God.
Finally in the Sixth I distinguish the action of the
understanding7 from that of the imagination;8 the marks by
which this distinction is made are described. I here show
that the mind of man is really distinct from the body, and at
the same time that the two are so closely joined together that
they form, so to speak, a single thing. All the errors which
proceed from the senses are then surveyed, while the means of
avoiding them are demonstrated, and finally all the reasons
from which we may deduce the existence of material things are
set forth. Not that I judge them to be very useful in
establishing that which they prove, to wit, that there is in
truth a world, that men possess bodies, and other such things
which never have been doubted by anyone of sense; but because
in considering these closely we come to see that they are
neither so strong nor so evident as those arguments which lead
us to the knowledge of our mind and of God; so that these last
must be the most certain and most evident facts which can fall
within the cognizance of the human mind.
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