It would certainly be absurd to doubt as to this. For
what was there in this first perception which was distinct?
What was there which might not as well have been perceived by
any of the animals? But when I distinguish the wax from its
external forms, and when, just as if I had taken from it its
vestments, I consider it quite naked, it is certain that
although some error may still be found in my judgment, I can
nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind.
But finally what shall I say of this mind, that is, of
myself, for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything
but mind? What then, I who seem to perceive this piece of wax
so distinctly, do I not know myself, not only with much more
truth and certainty, but also with much more distinctness and
clearness? For if I judge that the wax is or exists from the
fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly
that I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it.
For it may be that what I see is not really wax, it may also
be that I do not possess eyes with which to see anything; but
it cannot be that when I see, or (for I no longer take account
of the distinction) when I think I see, that I myself who
think am nought.
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