And in the little that I have just said, I think I have
summed up all that I really know, or at least all that
hitherto I was aware that I knew. In order to try to extend
my knowledge further, I shall now look around more carefully
and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other
things which I have not hitherto perceived. I am certain that
I am a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know
what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly
in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of
its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of that
which I state, which would not indeed suffice to assure me
that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing
which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false;
and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as
a general rule that all things which I perceive15 very clearly
and very distinctly are true.
At the same time I have before received and admitted many
things to be very certain and manifest, which yet I afterwards
recognised as being dubious.
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