But every time that this
preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents
itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is
easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in
matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence.
And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to
things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am
so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into
words such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can never
cause me to be nothing while I think that I am, or some day
cause it to be true to say that I have never been, it being
true now to say that I am, or that two and three make more or
less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest
contradiction. And, certainly, since I have no reason to
believe that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have
not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all, the
reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very
slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order to be able
altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God
as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that
there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a
deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything.
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