Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only
in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond
themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false; for
whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true
that I imagine the one that the other. We must not fear
likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections,
for although I may desire evil things, or even things that
never existed, it is not the less true that I desire them.
Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make,
in which I must take the greatest care not o deceive myself.
But the principal error and the commonest which we may meet
with in them, consists in my judging that the ideas which are
in me are similar or conformable to the things which are
outside me; for without doubt if I considered the ideas only
as certain modes of my thoughts, without trying to relate them
to anything beyond, they could scarcely give me material for
error.
But among these ideas, some appear to me to be innate,
some adventitious, and others to be formed [or invented] by
myself; for, as I have the power of understanding what is
called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, it appears to me
that I hold this power from no other source than my own
nature.
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