e. by the heat of the
fire near which I sit. And nothing seems to me more obvious
than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather
than anything else upon me.
Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently
strong and convincing. When I say that I am so instructed by
nature, I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which
impels me to believe in this connection, and not a natural
light which makes me recognise that it is true. But these two
things are very different; for I cannot doubt that which the
natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for
example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt,
or other facts of the same kind. And I possess no other
faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood, which can
teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not
really true, and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy.
But as far as [apparently] natural impulses are concerned, I
have frequently remarked, when I had to make active choice
between virtue and vice, that they often enough led me to the
part that was worse; and this is why I do not see any reason
for following them in what regards truth and error.
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