e. a manner or way of
thinking]. But in order that an idea should contain some one
certain objective reality rather than another, it must without
doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as
much formal reality as this idea contains of objective
reality. For if we imagine that something is found in an idea
which is not found in the cause, it must then have been
derived from nought; but however imperfect may be this mode of
being by which a thing is objectively [or by representation]
in the understanding by its idea, we cannot certainly say that
this mode of being is nothing, nor consequently, that the idea
derives its origin from nothing.
Nor must I imagine that, since the reality that I
consider in these ideas is only objective, it is not essential
that this reality should be formally in the causes of my
ideas, but that it is sufficient that it should be found
objectively. For just as this mode of objective existence
pertains to ideas by their proper nature, so does the mode of
formal existence pertain tot he causes of those ideas (this is
at least true of the first and principal) by the nature
peculiar to them.
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