For how would it be possible that I
should know that I doubt and desire, that is to say, that
something is lacking to me, and that I am not quite perfect,
unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than
myself, in comparison with which I should recognise the
deficiencies of my nature?
And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps
materially false and that consequently I can derive it from
nought [i.e. that possibly it exists in me because I am
imperfect], as I have just said is the case with ideas of
heat, cold and other such things; for, on the contrary, as
this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it
more objective reality than any other, there can be none which
is of itself more true, nor any in which there can be less
suspicion of falsehood. The idea, I say, of this Being who is
absolutely perfect and infinite, is entirely true; for
although, perhaps, we can imagine that such a Being does not
exist, we cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents
nothing real to me, as I have said of the idea of cold.
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