I likewise cannot complain
that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is
sufficient, ample and perfect, since as a matter of fact I am
conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits.
And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of
all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect
and so comprehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that
it might be yet greater and more perfect. For, to take an
example, if I consider the faculty of comprehension which I
possess, I find that it is of very small extent and extremely
limited, and at the same time I find the idea of another
faculty much more ample and even infinite, and seeing that I
can form the idea of it, I recognise from this very fact that
it pertains to the nature of God. If in the same way I
examine the memory, the imagination, or some other faculty, I
do not find any which is not small and circumscribed, while in
God it is immense [or infinite]. It is free-will alone or
liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can
conceive no other idea to be more great; it is indeed the case
that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know
that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God.
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