For example, when I lately examined whether anything
existed in the world, and found that from the very fact that I
considered this question it followed very clearly that I
myself existed, I could not prevent myself from believing that
a thing I so clearly conceived was true: not that I found
myself compelled to do so by some external cause, but simply
because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great
inclination of my will; and I believed this with so much the
greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less
indifference towards it. Now, on the contrary, I not only
know that I exist, inasmuch as I am a thinking thing, but a
certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented
to my mind; and it comes to pass that I doubt whether this
thinking nature which is in me, or rather by which I am what I
am, differs from this corporeal nature, or whether both are
not simply the same thing; and I here suppose that I do not
yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief
rather than the other. From this it follows that I am
entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny,
or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the
matter.
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