For being
accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between
existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the
existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that
we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But,
nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I
clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the
essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to
two right angles be separated from the essence of a
[rectilinear] triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the
idea of a valley; and so there is not any less repugnance to
our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to
whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain
perfection is lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which
has no valley.
But although I cannot really conceive of a God without
existence any more than a mountain without a valley, still
from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley, it
does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world;
similarly although I conceive of God as possessing existence,
it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God
which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity
upon things, and just as I may imagine a winged horse,
although no horse with wings exists, so I could perhaps
attribute existence to God, although no God existed.
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