For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I
understand anything very clearly and distinctly, I am
naturally impelled to believe it to be true, yet because I am
also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly
fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly, and
as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at
the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to
make it, it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present
themselves to me, which would easily cause me to change my
opinion, if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of
God, and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge, but
only vague and vacillating opinions. Thus, for example, when
I consider the nature of a [rectilinear] triangle, I who have
some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise
quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right
angles, and it is not possible for me not to believe this so
long as I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so soon as I
abstain from attending to the proof, although I still
recollect having clearly comprehended it, it may easily occur
that I come to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there
being a God.
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