For I can persuade myself of having been so
constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in
those matters which I believe myself to apprehend with the
greatest evidence and certainty, especially when I recollect
that I have frequently judged matters to be true and certain
which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be
altogether false.
But after I have recognised that there is a God?because
at the same time I have also recognised that all things depend
upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver, and from that have
inferred that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot
fail to be true?although I no longer pay attention to the
reasons for which I have judged this to be true, provided that
I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no
contrary reason can be brought forward which could ever cause
me to doubt of its truth; and thus I have a true and certain
knowledge of it. And this same knowledge extends likewise to
all other things which I recollect having formerly
demonstrated, such as the truths of geometry and the like; for
what can be alleged against them to cause me to place them in
doubt? Will it be said that my nature is such as to cause me
to be frequently deceived? But I already know that I cannot
be deceived in the judgment whose grounds I know clearly.
Pages:
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120