And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving,
etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it
is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and
in feeling and understanding. But it is quite otherwise with
corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these
imaginable by me which my mind cannot easily divide into
parts, and which consequently I do not recognise as being
divisible; this would be sufficient to teach me that the mind
or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had
not already learned it from other sources.
I further notice that the mind does not receive the
impressions from all parts of the body immediately, but only
from the brain, or perhaps even from one of its smallest
parts, to wit, from that in which the common sense27 is said
to reside, which, whenever it is disposed in the same
particular way, conveys the same thing to the mind, although
meanwhile the other portions of the body may be differently
disposed, as is testified by innumerable experiments which it
is unnecessary here to recount.
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